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ABSTRACT
Logic is the discipline concerned with providing valid general rules on which scientific reasoning and the resulting
propositions are based. To evaluate the validity of sentences in propositional calculus, we, typically, perform a
complete case analysis of all the possible truth-values assigned to the sentence’s propositional variables. Truth
tables provide a systematic method for performing such analysis in order to determine whether the sentence is valid,
satisfiable, contradictory, consistent, etc. However, in order to validate logical statements, we have to use valid truth
tables, i.e., truth tables that are provably consistent and justifiable by some natural criteria. The justification of the
truth table of some logical connectives is straightforward, due to the support of the table in everyday applications.
Nevertheless, the justification of one of the logical connectives, namely, the implication operator, has always been
difficult to build and understand. Though, the logical implication is arguably the most important operator because
of its applications as an inference engine for reasoning in science in general and control engineering in particular.
In this paper, the author presents this problem introducing a non-exhaustive proof, which justifies the logical
implication’s truth table in one phase. The author then proposes another optimal proof, discussing the points of
optimization and the effects of the resulting linguistic and philosophical interpretation on the scientific reasoning
processes. Finally, the paper envisions possible extension of the proposed methodology to solve similar problems
in various types of logic.
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1. Introduction
Logical reasoning has been the main pillar on which science is
constructed. In some times and some cases in history, logical
reasoning was the only pillar. The ancient Greek scientists relied
almost exclusively on logical reasoning in building their knowl-
edge and formulating their theories, as other scientific methods
were not yet technically developed to a satisfactory degree of
maturity and reliability. This resulted in a large repertoire of
theoretical science, some of which remains to be foundation for
sciences and mathematics until today; other turned out to be false
philosophical speculations.
The advent of the experimental paradigm of science and its in-
tegration with logical reasoning enabled the production of sound
science and, to a great extend, clarified the distinction between
science and philosophy. Today, computational methods have
emerged as the new major paradigm for scientific research, result-
ing in the classification of the scientific endeavors into three main
categories: theoretical, experimental, and computational science.
Regardless of the choice of methodology, logical reasoning
and mathematical logic remain to be the cornershotnes for all
the three main paradigms. After all, computation, at the bottom,
is automated logical reasoning and mathematical models and
techniques are tools for formulating and quantifying the reasoning
process.
The above introduction signifies the importance of forming,
producing, and validating logical propositions in science. The val-
idation process involves the evaluation of the validity of sentences
in propositional logic, which, in turn, involves the evaluation of
the statement’s truth function under all possible interpretations.
For example, a proposition P is said to be valid, also called a
tautology, if it is evaluated to be true under every possible inter-
pretation of P. On the other hand, P is said to be contradictory
if it is false under all possible interpretations. In between the
two extremes, there are different degrees of validity leading to
evaluating the sentence as satisfiable, consistent, etc. [1].
The validation process requires a complete analysis of all
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the possible truth-values under all possible interpretations of the
proposition to construct the truth function for that proposition.
This is typically performed by constructing truth tables, which list
all the possible truth-values for the proposition currently under
evaluation [2]. The use of truth tables is an important outcome of
the development of the theory of symbolic logic, which was initi-
ated by George Boole [3], who formulated the logic of Aristotle
as algebra of classes [4], [5]. The integration of symbolic logic
with the semantic theory of logic resulted in mathematical logic
and propositional calculus, which have had significant effect on
the development of science in general and the information and
computation theories in particular.
This section provided the necessary background for the cur-
rent paper, signifying the necessity of a sound validation process
for logical propositions, which are the building blocks of science
and knowledge. The next section presents the particular prob-
lem of justifying the logical implication table, states a possible
disadvantageous solution, and provides motivation for the need
for new proofs. Section three includes the author’s presentation
of an unpublished proof by Dr. Stephen Leach of Florida State
University based on the requirement specified by R. L. Goodstein
[6]. In section four, the author introduces his new automatable
proof based on incremental constructive reasoning. Section five,
then, includes a comparison between the two proofs pointing out
how the latter is advantageous over the other proofs. Section six
discusses the linguistic, philosophical, and scientific implications
and consequences of the table. Finally, section seven concludes
the paper and provides pointers to possible future follow up re-
search.
2. The Research Problem
The truth tables for many logical connectives used in constructing
compound propositions seem justifiable and easy to accept, even
without a mathematical proof. They simply go with the natural
intuition and make sense in daily applications. Propositional con-
nectives that fall into this category are the negation operator (NOT
connective, denoted as ¬), the conjunction operator (AND con-
nective, denoted as ∧), and the logical equivalence, also known
as the biconditional, operator (⇔) – that is the if − and − only −
if form (iff ). The disjunction operator (OR connective, denoted
as ∨) may seem a little more problematic until the type of the
intended disjunction, exclusive or inclusive, is determined. Once
this determination is made, the problem disappears. However,
one propositional connective, namely the logical implication (⇒),
also known as the conditional operator and the i f −then form, has
always been harder to justify and understand. Goodstein explains
this exceptional difficulty by arguing that the “everyday usage
[of the i f − then form] is inadequate to determine the table for
[the logical] implication since it serves only to tell us that a true
sentence does not imply a false one, but is silent on the question
of what is implied by a false sentence” [6]. The truth table for the
logical implication is illustrated in Table 1. In the table, P and Q
are sentence variables, 1 represents true, and 0 represents false.
It is important here to note that the current treatment of the if−
then form is only concerned with the truth function of the resulting
Table 1. Truth table for logical implication.





compound proposition. A compound sentence is considered to
be truth-functional, only if the truth-value of the sentence is a
function of the truth-value of its constituent sentence variables
[7]. It is needless to say that the everyday use of the if − then
form is not limited to the truth- functional applications.
Even after we limit our discussion to the truth-functional if
− then statements, when we look at Table 1, we see that each
cell in the third column could have been assigned any one of
the two values, 0 or 1, i.e., false or true, respectively. With four
rows representing all the possible combinations of the sentences
P and Q, then Table 1 is one of a total of 24 = 16 possible tables.
Now we find ourselves obligated to answer the question: why
should we believe that this table is the right one? The necessity
of answering the question is further amplified by the fact that
the resulting linguistic implication of the compound proposition
may not be so obvious or supported by the natural and intuitive
everyday usage of the sentence form.
Let us present the problem further by a concrete example. Let
the sentence variable P stands for the proposition “electromag-
netic waves travel in the void”, and let Q represents the sentence
“the ether exists”. Now, the compound proposition S1 = P⇒ Q
stands for “if electromagnetic waves travel in the void, then the
ether exists”. Let us also consider the compound proposition
S2 = ¬P⇒¬Q, which represents the proposition “if electromag-
netic waves do not travel in the void, then the ether does not exist”.
According to Table 1, the statement S1 is false but S2 is true. This
is not an obvious conclusion to many people. Both propositions
include one true and one false statement. In S1, the antecedent is
true and the consequence is false while S2 is vice versa.
Although the logical implication operator is the most con-
troversial among logical connectives, it is arguably the most
important in science and engineering applications. The addi-
tional importance of the conditional connective is attributed to
two sources. Firstly, it is inherently the building block for sci-
entific reasoning and the inference mechanisms necessary for
constructing proofs and drawing conclusions. A comprehensive
look at how the modern science developed at the dawn of the
twentieth century reveals a development pattern where the out-
come of experiments is used as the antecedent for an if − then –
i.e., a logical implication – statement. The consequence of the
if − then form comes then as a new theory, model, proposition,
or even a postulate, or set of postulates, that would lead later
to a new scientific discovery. This is how we established the
fact that light waves are electromagnetic waves and the fact that
electromagnetic waves travel in the void as a consequence of the
outcome of Michelson-Morley experiment. It is also how the
special theory of relativity based on the universality of the laws of
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physics and the speed of light evolved. Similarly was the rational
for the development of quantum mechanics, the series of models
for the atomic structure, the De Broglie’s hypothesis, and many
other discoveries that redefined the modern science. They all
were compound propositions of the “if P then Q” form (P⇒ Q
in symbolic notation) with different degrees of complexity. If we
take P to be the outcome of the experiment of Hans Geiger and
Ernest Marsden and Q to be the Rutherford model of the atom,
we get one of the most famous examples of the dependence of
science on the above reasoning process in the if − then form [8].
Secondly, among all the logical operators, the if − then form is of
exceptionally intensive and extensive use in system control theory
and applications. Many control systems, regardless of the type
of logic they utilize, rely on the automation of a set of if − then
rules for adaptive system control [9].
This discussion of the merits and criticality of the logical
implication makes it clear that it is of fundamental necessity
that the controversy about the if − then sentence form be solved
preferably through a solid mathematical proof, since obviously
other tools are not adequate or sufficient. The necessity here is
not for specialized logicians. The need is rather for students to
understand, applied scientists to use, and automated reasoning
practitioners to program.
A rather naı¨ve way to prove the correctness of Table 1 is to
generate all the possible sixteen tables and systematically prove
by contradiction the invalidity of each and every one of them,
except the one represented by Table 1. This would be a tedious
and very lengthy proof, which, consequently, would not contribute
significantly to the realization of the linguistic and philosophical
implications and the practical applications of Table 1. The next
two sections present alternate proofs to this exhaustive search
methodology. Both proofs assume that the tables for all other
logical operators are correct and can be used. Table 2 represents
the table for the logical conjunction operator since it will be
particularly used in both proofs.






3. A Proof by Incremental Constructive Rea-
soning
This proof was proposed by Dr. Stephen Leach at Florida State
University in the late 1970’s. The proof is unpublished and the
current presentation and mathematical formulation of the proof
are made by the author. Leach’s proof is based on the criteria set
by Goodstein [6], which states that a valid logical implication
table must preserve two properties, that is, it must be transitive
and non-commutative. Based on these criteria, Leach uses his
own mathematical logical formula to incrementally construct the
table, one row at a time, showing, in one phase, that Table 1 is the
only table that can be constructed without having to visit all or
any of the other fifteen tables.
The proof
In order for the table to be transitive, we want the proposition
Prop (1) below to be a tautology.
Prop (1)
[(P⇒ Q)∧ (Q⇒ R)]⇒ (P⇒ R)
The proposition Prop (1) being a tautology means, in words,
that if P always implies Q and Q always implies R, then we
can conclude that P always implies R. The non-commutability
property means that P⇒Q and Q⇒ P and cannot have the same
truth-value. This is important because if they do, the logical
implication (⇒) becomes a logical equivalence (⇔ ). Using these
two properties and assuming the correctness of the other truth
tables, Leach proceeds to justify the logical implication table,
starting by proving the last row of Table 1 by contradiction as
follows:
Suppose the last row of the table was as follows, in contradiction
with Table 1:
P Q P⇒ Q
0 0 0
If we substitute Q for R in Prop (1) we get
Prop (2)
{[(P⇒ Q)∧ (Q⇒ Q)]⇒ (P⇒ Q)}= 1
∗ ∵ (P⇒ Q) = 0 by the contradictory assumption,
† ∴ {[0∧0)]⇒ 0}= 0 by substituting 0 for each direct implica-
tion in Prop (2),
∴ {0⇒ 0}= 0 by substituting from the fourth row of Table 2, but
this contradicts with Prop (2) = 1 and the requirement that Prop
(1) is a tautology. Then, the contradictory assumption is incorrect
and the fourth row of Table 1 is correct.
∴ 0⇒ 0 = 1 (1)
Now, ∵ (0⇒ 0) = 1 and since Prop (1) is a tautology,
∴ {[(0⇒ 0)∧ (0⇒ 0)]⇒ (0⇒ 0)}= 1
∴ {[1∧1]⇒ 1}= 1 by substituting from (1)
∴ {1⇒ 1}= 1 by substituting from the first row of Table 2. This
proves the first row of Table 1.
This proves the first row of Table 1.
∴ 1⇒ 1 = 1 (2)
Now, by the second property of the table as required by Goodstein
to be non-commutative, (1⇒ 0) and (0⇒ 1), which are the
second and third rows of the table, cannot have the same truth-
values. Then, from the second and third row of Table 2 for the
logical conjunction we get,
∗ ∵ is symbolic notation for “since”.
† ∴ is symbolic notation for “then”.
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Prop (3)
{(1⇒ 0)∧ (0⇒ 1)}= 0
Since Prop (1) is a tautology, it should be true regardless of the
truth-values assigned to P, Q, and R. Then we are justified when
we pick any combination of truth-value assignments. Hence, we
consider the case when P = 1, Q = 0, and R = 1.
∴ {[(1⇒ 0)∧ (0⇒ 1)]⇒ (1⇒ 1)}= 1 since Prop (1) is a tau-
tology.
∴ {(0⇒ (1⇒ 1)}= 1 from Prop (3).
∴ {(0⇒ 1} = 1 by application of (2), and this proves the third
row of Table 1.
∴ 0⇒ 1 = 1 (3)
Now, by the non-commutability property, rows two and three of
Table 1 must have different truth-values.
∴ 1⇒ 0 = 0 (4)
By (1), (2), (3), and (4), Table 1 is justified and complete.
4. Alternate Automatable Proof
In this section, the author proposes a different proof, which is still
based on incremental constructive reasoning. Although the above
proof indeed inspired the new one, but the author developed the
new proof in an attempt to achieve three additional advantages:
1. Increased simplicity. The fundamental idea of both proofs
is to build on some natural criteria to which we want the
logical implication table to conform. However, the simpler
the criterion form and structure, the easier it is to under-
stand the table and its applications. After all, the logical
implication is not meant to be used only by mathematical
logicians.
2. Better systematic autonomy. Although relying on selected
natural criteria for justification has the advantage of provid-
ing support and acceptability for applications in reasoning
processes of any field, but we hope the proof itself is sys-
tematically automatable. This would have the advantage of
the proof being programmable into autonomous reasoning
and inference systems.
3. Self-evolution and self-evidence. Although the previous
proof followed incremental constructive reasoning to justify
the table one row at a time, it started by assuming the
existence of the table. This does not invalidate the proof
itself. However, it poses a big obstacle to achieving full
autonomy of the proving mechanism, since it does not
answer the question of how we generated the table to start
with. It seems to be subjectively selected from the sixteen
possible ones. A proof that generates the table from scratch
in a self-evolutionary self-evident manner would definitely
be a big plus from the points of credibility, simplicity, and
automatability.
The Proof
The logical implication table, to be correct, is expected to satisfy
the following two conditions:
• 1. For any two sentence variables P and Q, we want the
following proposition Prop (4) to be a tautology [1].
Prop (4)
(P∧Q)⇒ P
• 2. As required by Goodstein, the table is non-commutative,
that is P⇒Q and Q⇒ P cannot have the same truth-value
for all P and Q [6].
The first condition is necessary to maintain the compatibility with
the logical conjunction table, Table 2. The second is to distinguish
the logical implication from the logical equivalence, as explained
in the previous proof. Then, the reasoning process proceeds as
follows:
Since proposition Prop (4) is a tautology, (P∧Q)⇒ P is true,
regardless of the truth-values of P∧Q and P. Then we consider
all the possible cases for P∧Q. We have two cases: Case 1:
P∧Q = 1 and Case 2: P∧Q = 0.
Case 1: P∧Q = 1 iff P = 1 and Q = 1 from Table 2.
∴ [(1∧1)⇒ 1] = 1 since the proposition is a tautology.
∴ (1⇒ 1) = 1 from the first row of Table 2. This is the case of
row number one of Table 1 and we encode it into a new table,
Table 3. To follow the evolution of the table, we encode one phase
of the table at a time with the table number as Table 3–i, where i
represents the number of rows filled to the current phase.
Table 3.1. Logical implication table with one row.
P Q P⇒ Q
1 1 1
Case 2: P∧Q = 0. According to Table 2, this can happen in any
one of three subcases:
Case 2.1: when P = 1 and Q = 0.
∴ [(1∧0)⇒ 1] = 1 since the proposition is a tautol-
ogy.
∴ [0⇒ 1] = 1 from the second row of Table 2. This
is the case for row number three of Table 1. Then we
have the first and third rows thus far as in Table 3–2.
Case 2.2: when P = 0 and Q = 1.
∴ [(0∧1)⇒ 0] = 1 since the proposition is a tautol-
ogy.
∴ [0⇒ 0] = 1 from the third row of Table 2. This is
the case for row number four of Table 1. Then we
have rows number 1, 3, and 4 thus far as in Table
3–3.
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Table 3.2. Logical implication table with two rows.
P Q P⇒ Q
1 1 1
0 1 1
Table 3.3. Logical implication table with three rows.




Case 2.3: when P = 0 and Q = 0.
∴ [(0∧0)⇒ 0] = 1 since the proposition is a tautol-
ogy.
∴ [0⇒ 0] = 1 from the fourth row of Table 2. How-
ever, this does not produce any new result but the
redundant outcome asserts the case of row 4 in Table
3.
Now, by the non-commutability property, (P⇒ Q) and (Q⇒ P)
cannot have the same truth-value for all P and Q. Since P and
Q have the same truth-value in rows number 1 and 4, then row
number 2 must be different from row number 3.
∴ (0⇒ 0) = 1 in row number 3,
∴ (1⇒ 0) = 0 is the only choice for row number 2 and this
completes Table 3.
Table 3.4. The Logical implication table complete.





Now, Table 3 is complete and perfectly matches Table 1.
5. Comparison and Assessment
As stated above, the author attempted devising the latter proof
hoping to achieve three objectives, which would be three points
of improvement over the first proof. The first objective was to
aim at increased simplicity. This was implemented in the second
proof by building on a simpler tautology than the ones used by
Goodstein or Leach. Proposition Prop (4) is obviously simpler
than Prop (1) and involves smaller number of variables – two
rather than three. The second objective of the author’s proof was
to attempt to achieve better systematic autonomy. This means
to minimize the subjective involvement in the justification pro-
cess. In the first proof, in order to prove the third row in (3),
we subjectively selected one case out of 23 = 8 cases, that was
the case when P = 1, Q = 0, and R = 1. The alternative to this
subjective interference in the proving process was to consider all
the possible cases, eight of them. The outcome would still have
been the same, but the proof would have been much longer and
the results would have been too redundant. Hence, we had to
choose between extreme redundancy and subjective interference.
On the other hand, in the second proof, there was no need for
subjective intervention at all, and we still had only one redundant
evaluation, which served to assert the fourth row of the table with-
out producing new results. Unlike carrying on seven redundant
evaluations, this is obviously an acceptable computational cost
for autonomy implementation.
Finally, Leach’s proof pre-assumed the existence of the log-
ical implication table, Table 1. The task then was to prove the
correctness of the table by contradiction if the fourth row was
set differently. However, while this does not disqualify the proof,
it does not indicate how Table 1 was selected among sixteen
possible tables either. In contrast, the author’s proof did not
pre-assume the existence of any table. Rather, it systematically
generated the table from scratch. This leads to not only full objec-
tive autonomy eliminating any subjective intervention, but also a
self-evolutionary and self-evident table. This was the last objec-
tive of the author to produce a simpler, more credible, and fully
authomatable proof.
6. Usage, Applications, and Further Justifi-
cation
Although the proofs above justify the truth table for the logical
implication connective, some background in mathematical logic,
admittedly at a certain level, is required not only to generate the
proofs but also to understand them. Understanding the logical,
linguistic, and philosophical applications of other logical opera-
tors may not necessarily require such a background. Let us take
the table for the logical AND, Table 2 above, for example. Ac-
cording to this table the statement (P∧Q) can be true only when
both P and Q are true. This is why (P∧Q) = 1, i.e., true, in the
first row and is false, 0, otherwise. In words, this is not difficult
to understand or explain even to audience without mathematical
background. It simply states that if P and Q stand for simple
sentences, then the compound statement “P and Q” would be
true only when both “P” and “Q” are true. For instance, if “P”
= “today is sunny”, and “Q” = “today is a holiday”, then the
statement (P∧Q) would be true only if today is both sunny and a
holiday. The truth of one of the two is not sufficient to make the
statement true, and the falsity of just one of them is sufficient to
make the statement false. Explaining the disjunction, OR, table
can be done similarly without the use of mathematics, after the
type of the disjunction is selected, that is exclusive or inclusive
OR.
But what about the if − then table, can we explain it in words
in a similar manner without using mathematical logic? The author
contends that the answer is: yes, we can, but we have to admit that
it would not be as easy as it is in the cases of AND, OR, and NOT .
A minimum level of sophistication is needed to understand the
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linguistic interpretation of the logical implication table. Here is a
proposed way of explaining and applying it, first to the general
audience and then to the scientific community.
Let us take the case “P” = “the sun rises in the east”, and “Q”
= “the Giza pyramids are in Egypt”. According to Table 1, since
P is true and Q is true, the “P⇒ Q” = “if the sun rises in the east
then the Giza pyramids are in Egypt” is true, which is obvious; a
true condition leading to a true conclusion makes a true statement,
even when the condition and conclusion seem unrelated, after all
we are analyzing the truth functional statement. Now, let us take
row 2 and make Q false by replacing it with ¬Q. Then row 2
states that the statement “P⇒ Q” = “if the sun rises in the east
then the Giza pyramids are not in Egypt” is false. This should
be obvious too because we have a true condition that leads to a
false conclusion, which would be against our knowledge of the
current world where we live. As for rows 3 and 4, let us make
“P” false by replacing it with its negation “¬P”. Then rows 3
and 4 say that “¬P⇒ Q” = “if the sun does not rise in the east
then the Giza pyramids are in Egypt” is a true statement, and that
“¬P⇒¬Q ” = “if the sun does not rise in the east then the Giza
pyramids are not in Egypt” is also a true statement. This simply is
saying that if the sun does not rise in the east then any conclusion
can be considered true. This is because if the sun does not rise
in the east, then we would be in a different world where we do
not know if the Giza pyramids are in Egypt or not. In fact, in that
case, would not even know if the pyramids or Egypt would exist
at all. Then it is safe to assume that any conclusion is true in that
case.
In the example above, the falsity of the antecedent of the
conditional statement led to a completely different world where
we would not know the correct conclusion and assumed that by
default any conclusion could lead to a true statement. However,
the antecedent of a conditional statement does not always have
to be so fundamental to our world like the sun rising in the east,
which renders its negation as such unrealistic philosophical hy-
pothesis. Sometimes the falsity of the antecedent is the result of
wrong, or lack of, information. Furthermore, the truth and falsity
of the antecedent, or the consequence, may change over time,
but this still would not change the validity of the logical impli-
cation table. For example, at one point in time, our assumption
of the existence of the ether was solely based on logical reason-
ing in the if − then form in the absence of any experimental or
observational evidence in support or denial of the proposition. If
light is electromagnetic waves, then the ether must exists. This
was based on another assumption that waves must travel in a
medium. However, since Michelson and Morley discovered the
non-existence of the ether, we flipped the antecedent and the
consequence in the conditional statement to state that “if there
is no ether, then electromagnetic waves can travel in the void”.
However, the author contends that the argument in the previous
paragraph still holds because a change in our knowledge of the
world is equivalent to a change in the world itself. If what we
knew turns out to be incorrect, then this is equivalent to knowing
a different world. In both cases we reasoned about a hypothesis
that never existed. The only difference between the two cases is
that when we reasoned about the sun not rising in the east, we
reasoned about an unrealistic assumption if it occurs in the future,
while with the case of the ether we reasoned about an unrealistic
assumption that we mistakenly thought was realistic in the past.
To demonstrate this idea, let us take the same proposition we
ended up with in the above example: “if there is no ether, then
electromagnetic waves can travel in the void”. Now we know
that this statement is true because both the antecedent and the
consequence of the conditional statement are both true. But what
if we discover one day that the ether actually exists, would the
truth of the same whole compound statement be reversed then?
In that case, the antecedent, i.e., “there is no ether” becomes false,
which according to Table 1 makes the whole statement still true
regardless of the truth-value of the consequence. This is in perfect
agreement with the argument above about a different world where
the sun does not rise in the east. In both cases the statement was
made about a different world that has not been known in the first
example, and was thought incorrectly to be known in the latter.
Now, one serious argument can be raised against the interpre-
tation above, that is, on rows 3 and 4, if the falsity of the condition
means that we simply do not know the conclusion, why is it the
case that we assume both to be true? Why not assume both to
be false instead? The author’s answer to that question is that the
default choice of the truth of the proposition is consistent with
the assumption that when the antecedent is false then we do not
know the consequence and hence all consequences are possible.
If one consequence makes the statement false, this would be as if
we are stating the impossibility of that consequence. This would
be against the natural conclusion that all the consequences are
possible when the condition is false, which means that we are
dealing with a different, or unknown, world. Normally in science,
we assume all outcomes are possible unless we have evidence or
reason to believe that some consequence is impossible. Therefore,
the default setting of the proposition to be true, rather than false,
when the antecedent is false is supported by some natural criteria.
For a concrete example of this approach, let us consider rea-
soning process about String Theory. We all know today that
although string theorists have some mathematical evidence and
basis for the theory, the skeptics argue that we have no way today,
or in the foreseen future, to test the string theory. Hence, string
theorists are building arguments on unverifiable science, which
renders all consequences possible. Thus far, this deduction is in
agreement with the above interpretation of the logical implica-
tion. Nevertheless, without taking sides on the string theory, the
author wants to use a reasoning process about the theory to prove
the point of the above interpretation of Table 1. Therefore, we
consider the case when “P” = “the string theory is confirmed”,
which both the advocates and the skeptics agree is a false state-
ment, taking into account the fact that ‘confirmed’ means tested
methodically and found to be verifiable and applicable. Now,
let us take the case of “Q” = “the quantum theory is correct”,
which we all agree is a true statement according to our knowledge
today. Then let us consider the two propositions (P⇒ Q) and
(P⇒¬Q). The first proposition states that “if the string theory
is confirmed the quantum theory is correct”, while the second
proposition states that “if the string theory is confirmed the quan-
tum theory is incorrect”. The author argued above that it is safe
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and natural to assume both these propositions to be true, which is
in accordance with the fact that all conclusions are possible since
P is false. Indeed, setting either, or both, of the above two propo-
sitions to be false, implies that we have knowledge or evidence
of the impossibility of some consequence of the confirmation of
string theory. This surely contradicts with the assumption that P
is false. Otherwise, the implied knowledge or evidence could be
taken as a confirmation of the theory, which would make P a true
statement.
The above linguistic interpretation is also asserted by the
fact that logical implication P⇒ Q is logically equivalent to the
logical disjunction ¬P∨Q. Both statement forms have the same
truth table. This implies that one can be taken as a way of looking
at the other. The logical equivalence between the two implies
that for the “if P then Q” to be true, P must be false, or Q must
be true. When P is false, the statement will be true regardless of
the truth-value of Q. When Q is true, the statement will be true
regardless of the truth-value of P. This goes in perfect agreement
with the preceding linguistic interpretation.
7. Conclusion and Future Vision
It is possible to justify the logical implication table of proposi-
tional calculus without having to perform exhaustive search of
all possible sixteen tables. This paper presented two methods of
proof by incremental constructive reasoning: one is an unpub-
lished proof by Dr. Stephen Leach of Florida State University,
and one made by the author. In each proof, one row of the table
is either proved – as in the first proof – or generated – as in the
second. Once a row is proven or generated, it can be used to gen-
erate another, which in turn is used again until the entire table is
constructed in one phase as a single solution with no alternatives.
The author devised the second proof to achieve three objectives:
develop a simpler proof, implement full autonomy, and build a
self-evolutionary, self-evident table.
The logical implication is of great importance in all types of
logic because of its use in scientific reasoning and developing
inference and control systems. Hence, a systematic method of
justification based on defined natural criteria is essential to the
understanding, functionality, and utilization of the table. The de-
velopment of the second proof contributes to the understanding of
the linguistic interpretation of the table. In addition, the resulting
automatable proof is necessary for designing logical systems and
computing with words
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